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Innovating European Defence 
 
Simon J. Smith 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
If war is inherently a social act, the same must be said of military innovation. Even narrowing 
down the key terms and definitions reveals this. The subject of this chapter is the innovation 
of European defence but the literature on military change has been referred to as ‘revolution’ 
(as in the Revolution in Military Affairs), ‘transformation’ (as in military, martial or force 
transformation), ‘innovation’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘change in military praxis’ (see Grissom, 2006).  
 
Traditionally, the literature on military innovation was understood to be more the discipline of 
History and Military Studies than a Social Science per se. According to Grissom (Grissom, 
2006: 906), this early literature was formed of ‘grand historical narratives, operational 
histories, or bureaucratic-political case studies’. That is until the publication of The Sources of 
Military Doctrine by Barry Posen in 1984 (Posen, 1984). Posen stands out for bringing a social 
scientific approach to the study of military innovation, but is representative of only one school 
of thought on how militaries innovate. Since then, there has been a flourishing literature that is 
informed by both the disciplines of History and the Social Sciences.  
 
Stephen Rosen has defined major innovation in defence organizations as ‘a change that forces 
one of the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation 
to other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions’ (Rosen, 1988: 134). 
This definition is appropriate because it allows us to understand innovation in terms of material, 
ideational and operational indicators of change. Since the end of the Cold War, military 
organizations in Europe have faced significant reductions in both budgets and manpower while 
many have also been conducting martial operations either independently or through collective 
security organizations such as the EU or NATO. In short, European militaries have been asked 
to do more with less which, in turn, necessitates some form of innovation. The aim of this 
chapter is to understand the various ways defence forces in Europe have innovated to 
accommodate this confluence of factors. The chapter addresses military innovation by first 
looking at historical, geopolitical and strategic contextual trends. The chapter will then outline 
some of the key conceptual ways that scholars have sought to theorise drivers of innovation in 
military organizations more generally. Finally, we will apply these concepts to specific cases 
in order to illuminate the varied and particular approaches to innovation that European 
militaries have incorporated to meet their material, ideational and operational challenges. 
 
Military Innovation and the Traditional Approach: key lessons from History 
 
This section illustrates some of the central themes and motivating questions that have been 
central to the more ‘grand historical narratives’ approach to understanding military innovation. 
It will demonstrate the ways in which key historical events – in particular large-scale wars – 
have shaped the thinking of military strategists and organisations when it comes to how they 
prepare, respond and generally attempt to innovate before and after these events. It will also 
demonstrate how scholars and theorists have come to understand the central questions and 
challenges that face military organisations in terms of innovation in response to socio-political, 
resource, and organisational concerns. Table 1 offers a comprehensive (but not necessarily 
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exhaustive or mutually exclusive) indication of the challenges and questions facing modern 
military forces and their prospects for innovation that are considered in this chapter.  
 
Table	1:	Types	of	Questions	Driving	Military	Innovation	
Socio-political Based Questions: 
To have democratic-political oversight of armed forces? 
What is the military for and what is the extent and range of tasks it is expected to perform? 
To pursue nuclear forces or remain conventional only? 
All-volunteer forces versus conscription? 
The role of women in the armed forces? 
What degree (if any) do alliances play in a military strategy? 
How much to spend as a percentage of GDP on armed forces? 
To what degree will AFs participate in frontline high-intensity tactics and operations? 
What ratio between territorial defence and expeditionary forces? 
To what degree should the military be integrated with another state’s or an International 
Organisation’s military decision-making, command and operational structures?  
Economic and Resource Based Questions: 
Full-spectrum force versus specialisation? 
How much to spend on new capability development and R&D versus only maintaining 
current force posture? 
What is your Defence Industrial Strategy? 
To buy military capabilities off-the shelf, develop and procure from domestic defence 
industry or pursue multinational military development and procurement programmes – or 
some mixture of these options? 
How to prioritise quantity versus quality of military capability? 
Organisational Based Questions: 
Size of regular forces versus dependency on reserves? 
What ratio between land, air and sea force structure (now also cyber and space)? 
The ratio of prioritization between preparedness, doctrine and capabilities for conventional 
warfighting (e.g. Fighting Near-Peer Adversaries) and/or irregular warfighting (e.g. coin)? 
To prioritise manoeuvre or attrition when preparing for future war? 
How will technology and military capabilities shape the character of war? 
To what extent will your forces be interoperable with allies? 
What percentage of your force will be earmarked for bi-lateral or multilateral military 
operations or peace-keeping missions? 
How to prioritise risk versus force protection? 
 
 
 
A central concern of military strategists and organisations has always been attempting to 
understand the character (not the nature) of the next war.  According to Clausewitz, the famous 
Prussian military strategist war’s nature does not change but its character often does 
(Clausewitz, 1997: 22). As Christopher Mewett (2014) has explained, the nature of war relates 
to its ‘unchanging essence’ or, ‘those things that differentiate war (as a type of phenomenon) 
from other things’. Thus, the nature of war is ‘violent, interactive, and fundamentally political’. 
However, the ‘character of war describes the changing way that war as a phenomenon 
manifests in the real world’ (Mewett, 2014). Logically, our focus must be skewed towards the 
character of warfare as our concern is the processes and drivers of military innovation. How 
and why militaries change, adapt and transform in order to be fit for (some) purpose – 
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traditionally that of wining wars. This chapter will consider how militaries – specifically 
European militaries – innovate in terms of both theory and practice. 
 
In terms of traditional approaches to innovation, thinkers tended to address this question 
according to strict interpretations of Defence and Military Studies. In other words, the focus 
was primarily on the study of military tactics, operations and strategy, the outcome of large 
scale wars and any lessons-learned that could be gained. For example, they may consider if the 
next war (i.e. a war that may have to be fought) is likely to be dominated by defence or offence, 
often referred to as manoeuvre or attrition. A separate but related issue is the impact of 
technology and military capabilities for shaping the character of the next war. The First World 
War is often, as we will see below, understood as a classic example of when military strategists 
got things wrong – and devastatingly so – but as this section demonstrates, military strategists 
quite often get it wrong. A few key historical examples help to illustrate this.  
 
In the current age, conflict is often described with terms such as irregular or hybrid warfare 
and fought in grey zones. But the traditional understanding of regular warfare is something 
that takes place between the identifiable militaries of states (usually great powers) and with 
finite conclusions. Of course, these are generalities and historians are always keen to point this 
out. Yet, before major wars, there is always a lot of uncertainty about what the next war will 
look like and how the combination of capabilities, technology and doctrine will impact on the 
tangible character of the conflict that transpires.  
 
The accepted thinking before the First World War was that a combination of speed - due to 
industrialisation and advances in technology leading to an increased lethality of weapons - 
would mean this next war would be deadly, mobile, offensive and short. Deadly as it may have 
been, the war was in fact a slow, bogged-down war of attrition. Military planners 
fundamentally misunderstood the impact of those weapons they believed to be offensive 
(machineguns and artillery) which turned out to be much more suited towards defensive tactics 
and operations. Therefore, a central concern that emerged from the Great War - and one that 
focused the minds of strategist and innovators alike during the inter-war period – was how to 
burst the tyranny of defence. Wartime is a critical driver of innovation by necessity but 
strategists also try to use times of peace to learn key lessons from the past to innovate their 
forces, capabilities and doctrine. 
 
This leads to another key theme emanating from the traditional approaches to military 
innovation: innovators and planners usually draw different lessons from the study of previous 
wars. In the inter-war period, strategists from all the great powers did exactly this. The 
conclusion that the French Army drew form the First World War was to further strengthen 
strategies of defence, ultimately resulting in the Maginot Line. The German answer was to 
prioritise combined-arms with speed and mobility by innovating and refining their use of 
capabilities and doctrine towards blitzkrieg. During the same period, but not simultaneously, 
factions arose in both the US (within the Army Air Corp) and the United Kingdom (the RAF) 
that looked to airpower for strategic answers on how to win wars. In short, military thinkers 
and strategists often prepare for the last (or wrong) war. Moreover, war and the perceived threat 
of war causes competition for ideas with regard the most prudent ways for militaries to 
innovate. 
 
Interestingly, capabilities were generally advancing in line with technological progress for all 
the great military powers. The difference was how the various military organisations chose to 
employ those capabilities. Michael Horowitz (2010: 7) has termed this ‘adoption capacity 
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theory’ or the match between the financial and organizational requirements for adopting a new 
type of military innovation and the capabilities that a particular country might have. All the 
great powers were developing advanced (for the time) prototypes of submarines, aircraft and 
armoured fighting vehicles but the missions they assigned those capabilities and the doctrine 
they applied were distinctive and tailored to their own lessons-learned. 
 
Before we turn to the next section, two more themes that developed out of the more traditional 
approaches are insightful with regard to innovation more broadly. The first is that advocates of 
innovation often oversell (at least initially) the strategic impact of their proposed innovation. 
During the Second World War, both the examples of blitzkrieg and strategic airpower help to 
reinforce this concept. Although blitzkrieg was a highly successful military tactic, this lethal 
combination of combined arms and manoeuvre was not enough to translate into a strategic 
victory on either the Western or Eastern fronts. Moreover, Germany’s adversaries were 
eventually able to learn and adopt these tactics as well, demonstrating again that innovation 
tends to happen most rapidly during war. In the case of strategic airpower, early attempts to 
innovate and apply these tactics were not met with the success rates that the first US Army Air 
Corps’ advocates like Edgar Gorrell, Thomas Milling, William "Billy" Mitchell, and William 
Sherman  had envisioned or asserted before the start of the war.  All of this points to one final 
theme - certain factions of innovation may fight over the best tactics, operations and strategies 
but it is war that ultimately decides. 
 
 
Military Innovation and the Social Sciences: theorizing innovation 
 
The study of military innovation began to take on a more social-scientific approach in the 1980s 
with the publication of The Sources of Military Doctrine. Yet the literature has advanced and 
broadened considerably since then. Terriff et al. (2010: 7) have distinguished ‘three main 
factors that shape the trajectory of military innovation: threat, civil-military relations and 
military culture’. This section aims to distinguish the various strands in this literature and to 
identify the key theoretical assumptions attached to each (see Table 2 below). But before this 
can be achieved, it is important to put forth a general definition of military innovation. Stephen 
Rosen has defined major innovation in defence organizations as ‘a change that forces one of 
the primary combat arms of a service to change its concepts of operation and its relation to 
other combat arms, and to abandon or downgrade traditional missions’ (Rosen, 1988: 134).  
 
Building on Rosen, Grissom (2006: 907) offers a definition whereby three elements constitute 
a tacit definition of military innovation.  
 
(1) an innovation changes the manner in which military formations 
function in the field. Measures that are administrative or bureaucratic 
in nature, such as acquisition reform, are not considered legitimate 
innovation unless a clear link can be drawn to operational praxis. 
(2) an innovation is significant in scope and impact. Minor reforms or 
those that have had ambiguous effects on a military organization are 
excluded, implying a consequentialist understanding of military 
innovation. 
(3) innovation is tacitly equated with greater military effectiveness. Only 
reforms that produce greater military effectiveness are studied as 
innovations, and few would consider studying counterproductive 
policies as innovations.  
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This definition approximates to ‘a change in operational praxis that produces a significant 
increase in military effectiveness as measured by battlefield results’ (Grissom, 2006). Some 
literature makes distinctions between ‘sustaining innovation’ and disruptive innovation’ 
(Farrell et al., 2013: 8).  As described in their significant volume Transforming Military Power 
since the Cold War, ‘sustaining innovation’ seeks to ‘improve on traditionally valued ways of 
war’. The latter is an innovation that seeks to improve ‘undervalued ways of war, or to develop 
wholly new ways of war’. They also note that ‘disruptive innovation’ is a more sizable 
challenge than ‘sustaining innovation’ due to the necessary changes in ‘vested organizational 
interests’ and ‘dominant organizational ideas about war’ (Farrell et al., 2013: 8). Taken 
together, this description allows us to understand innovation as material, ideational and 
operational indicators of change. But we must also ask, how and from where do these changes 
originate? Is innovation driven by exogenous or endogenous dynamics or some mixture of 
both? To do this, let us now turn to the major schools of military innovation. 
 
The first is that most identified with the work of Barry Posen, the civil-military model of 
military innovation. Posen’s (1984) work also investigated the key interwar doctrinal 
developments by the German, British and French armed forces as alluded to in the section 
above. However, his analysis focused on a critical explanatory variable – the dynamics of civil-
military relations. He argued that this civil-military dynamic is achieved through a response to 
perceived external threats which, in turn, determine if and how militaries innovate. According 
to Posen, innovation succeeds when statesmen ‘intervene in military service doctrinal 
development’ and ideally with the support of ‘maverick officers’. Furthermore, if militaries 
fail to innovate, they will ‘gradually stagnate and ultimately fail the societies they exist to 
serve’ (Grissom, 2006: 909; Posen, 1984: 222-236). Clearly, in this model innovation is 
derived from exogenous factors and follows a top-down logic. This model recognises military 
innovation as critically dependent on the influence and manoeuvring of political/civilian 
leadership to orchestrate change. This does include interaction between the civil-military 
leadership but the former retain dominance via their access to and control of resources and 
other forms of civil authority. 
 
Resources as an external driver of change are also at the centre of the interservice model of 
military innovation (for example, see: Sapolsky, 1972, 2000; Bacevich, 1986; Cote, 1998). 
Within this understanding, it is not the dynamic between the civilian and military branches per 
se – which does still exist -  but the resulting competition between the distinct service-branches 
of the military for resources (normally in a resource-scare environment) that is the primary 
driver of innovation. To rephrase Rosen’s definition above: a primary combat arm of a service 
will change its concept of operations and its relation to other combat arms, and abandons or 
downgrade traditional missions - while competing for resources in pursuit of other concepts, 
missions and capabilities to stay relevant.  In short, the processes here are still externally driven, 
highly political but overwhelmingly bureaucratic due to a mixture of high reticence towards 
change and the interservice component of resource competition. 
 
The intraservice model of military innovation changes the focus from interservice to 
intraservice competition and specifically ‘competition between branches of the same military 
service’ (Grissom, 2006: 913). Peter Rosen (1991) has been a primary thinker in this 
understanding of innovation.  He postulates that service are not static unitary actors. In fact, 
they produce internal actors who ‘advocate’ innovation in pursuit of ‘a new theory of victory, 
an explanation of what the next war will look like and how officers must fight if it is to be won’ 
(Rosen, 1991: 20). As Grissom explains, ‘innovation in modern military organizations tends to 
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involve competition between established branches of a military service and new branches that 
embrace new military capabilities’ (Grissom, 2006: 913). Again, we can see a connection to 
the approaches in the previous section: aircraft carrier innovation over the battleship (Royal 
Navy) or strategic bombing innovation over airpower seen only as tactical ground support (US 
Army Air Corp). Critical to innovation under this approach is the establishment of ‘a new arm 
or branch of service and opening the senior officer echelons to officers from the new arm’ 
(Grissom, 2006: 914). 
 
Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and, most notably Theo Farrell have been critical to the 
development of a forth strand in the literature – the Cultural Model of Military Innovation. In 
the work The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, Farrell recognizes 
culture to be ‘intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their 
situations, and the possibilities of action’ (Farrell and Terriff, 2001). This, he argues, is a 
significant driver of military innovation. In their contribution, A Transformation Gap? 
American Innovation and European Military Change, the authors offer the concept of military 
culture as a vital ‘shaping factor’ (Terriff et al., 2010: 8). Military Culture encapsulates those 
‘identities, norms and values’ whereby military organisations internalise their ‘role and 
function’ in response to their understanding of their external security environment (Terriff et 
al., 2010: 8). 
 
What is significant, is that military culture can actually transpire into a ‘brake on innovation’ 
due to its reflection of inherent biases derived from those very identities, norms and values. As 
Joseph Schumpeter has argued (in Sapolsky, 2000: 35), resistance to change in organisations 
is expected given that there are winners and losers to any change. Innovation, he argues, ‘is a 
process of creative destruction. The new kills off the old’ (Schumpeter in Sapolsky, 2000: 35). 
But unlike Posen who argues military innovation comes from the outside, this brake can only 
be overcome by a credible military ‘leader with authority’ to advocate for the necessary cultural 
change. If this is a direct challenge to a military organisation’s ‘core identity, it is still likely to 
be problematic (Terriff et al., 2010: 8). As Farrell and Terriff (2010: 9) understand it: 
 
Innovation that goes against organizational identity usually requires 
some external shock to military culture, such as defeat in war, in order 
to jolt the military into a fundamental rethink of its purpose and core 
business’. 
 
Before moving to the next section, following table gives an overview of the key theoretical 
schools of military innovation studies as well as some key empirical examples and leading 
scholars within the various conceptual strands of the literature. 
 
Table	2:	Theories	of	Military	Innovation	
Model of Military 
Innovation 
Key Theoretical 
Assumptions of the 
Model 
Empirical 
Examples 
Key Authors 
The Civil-Military 
Model of Military 
Innovation: 
 
Civil-military 
dynamics in 
response to 
perceived external 
threats 
Key interwar 
doctrinal 
developments by the 
German, British and 
French armed 
forces. 
Barry Posen, B.,. 
Kimberly M. Zisk 
Edmund Beard 
Deborah Avant 
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determine if and 
how militaries 
innovate (Grissom, 
2006: 908). 
 
The Interservice 
Model of Military 
Innovation: 
 
Resource scarcity is 
a key catalyst for 
innovation. Military 
organizations seek 
to maintain their 
budget 
authority and end-
strength, which 
requires them to 
maintain control 
over their traditional 
missions. This 
model posits that 
services will 
compete to develop 
capabilities to 
address these 
contested mission 
areas, believing that 
additional resources 
will accrue to the 
winner. The result is 
innovation 
(Grissom, 2006: 
910). 
 
Development of the 
Polaris submarine-
launched ballistic 
missile system. 
 
The development of 
the A-10 Warthog 
and the ‘Close Air 
Support Debate’. 
Harvey M. Sapolsky 
Douglas N. Campbell 
Michael Armacost 
Owen Cote 
Andrew Bacevich 
 
 
The Intraservice 
Model of Military 
Innovation: 
 
Military services 
should not be treated 
as unitary actors. 
Instead, innovation 
in modern military 
organizations 
tends to involve 
competition between 
established branches 
of a military 
service and new 
branches that 
embrace new 
military capabilities. 
The innovation 
process begins when 
senior officers 
develop ‘a new 
theory of 
US Department of 
Defense created 
innovative new 
special operations 
capabilities during 
the 1980s by 
managing 
intraservice politics. 
 
The development of 
the Tomahawk 
cruise missile. 
 
The development of 
the M2 Bradley 
infantry fighting 
vehicle. 
 
Stephen P. Rosen,  
Jon F. Giese 
Susan L. Marquis 
Vincent Davis 
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victory, an 
explanation of what 
the next war will 
look like and how 
officers must fight if 
it is to be won’. An 
‘ideological 
struggle’ ensues 
within the service. 
Advocates of the 
new theory work 
within the service 
to find allies and 
resources (Grissom, 
2006: 913) 
The Cultural Model 
of Military 
Innovation: 
 
Culture (defined as 
‘intersubjective 
beliefs about the 
social and natural 
word that define 
actors, their 
situations, and the 
possibilities of 
action’) is a major 
causal factor 
in military 
innovation. culture 
sets the context for 
military 
innovation, 
fundamentally 
shaping 
organizations’ 
reactions to 
technological 
and strategic 
opportunities 
(Grissom, 2006: 
916). 
The development of 
French and British 
doctrine between the 
World Wars. 
 
The relationship 
between 
professional military 
education and the 
professional culture 
of a military 
organization. 
Theo G. Farrell 
Terry Terriff 
Robert E. Mullins  
Emily O. Goldman 
 
 
 
 
Innovating European Defence  
Given the strands of literature outlined in the previous section, how can we then apply this to 
the case of Europe specifically?  What is needed is an analytical framework that would allow 
us to cut across these literatures of transformation to provide some meaningful understanding 
around the specificity of innovation regarding European militaries. In short, what are the 
implied drivers of innovation?  
 
The first is that militaries are being used beyond their traditional Cold War remits of national 
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and regional defence towards counter-insurgency (COIN), peacekeeping, counter piracy, 
counter terrorism, cyber security and more. In line with Posen’s argument, this change is a 
response to the changing strategic context in which militaries find themselves. The second 
driver is budgets, or rather, how much and in what way are governments paying for their 
militaries. Like Sapolsky (1972, 2000), militaries are just one of many policy areas for which 
governments are responsible. Furthermore, this change in government priorities also reacts to 
social and political value changes which turn into electoral constraints (Edmunds, 2006). 
Finally, the third driver is the socio-technological adaptations that we see in applied operational 
contexts challenging traditional platforms, forcing militaries to rethink force, mass and space. 
As Farrell et al (2013) suggest, there is a constant tension between the ever-changing 
adversarial relationship with the enemy and the resources that a military actually maintains.  
 
There are other drivers at play. One of the most significant has been the changing nature of the 
Trans-Atlantic Alliance. This has three over-arching explanations.  First, NATO has both 
enlarged and expanded geographically from its 12 founding members to a current membership 
of 29 states stretching much further east than during the Cold War. Second, NATO - or NATO 
member states acting in coalitions of the willing - have conducted military operations from 
Bosnia and then Kosovo, to Afghanistan and Iraq (though the latter not a NATO operation 
itself), to off the coast of Somalia and Libya. For some, like Stuart Croft et al (2000), operations 
have given NATO a new lease and as we will see, they have also been a key driver of innovation 
for many European states. Finally, we have the US’s changing relationship with Europe, from 
‘pivots’ to ‘resets’ and there is uncertainty about what the medium to long term strategy is for 
the US government and where the transatlantic partnership fits into that. This uncertainty has 
only increased under the Trump Administration since 2017. Nevertheless, the US remains a 
key transmission-belt for European military innovation, perhaps even more so than European 
governments themselves.  
 
The explanatory logic contained in the four models outlined above has been evident in 
European innovation since the Cold War. This literature is distinctly layered whereby military 
innovation and transformation is driven by state interest that is filtered through various external 
threat perceptions, attitudes towards alliance politics, domestic political-social agendas, and/or 
combat-operational necessities. In the immediate post-Cold War era, European governments 
welcomed the so-called ‘peace dividend’ and their militaries have been shaped less by 
existential threats posed by great powers as the context of European security changed to making 
and keeping the peace, to fighting the ‘war on terror’. At the same time, the US was 
experimenting with different approaches to warfare that would attempt to build in momentum 
and change. European militaries have also experienced the other layered drivers, as NATO 
enlarged and ‘transformed’, as defence budgets shrank and services competed, and as European 
militaries found themselves in protracted but illusive combat in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
However, the transformation literature fails to take into account the inter-linking between 
layers. Rather than seeing these drivers as distinct, we should instead see them as inter-related 
and reflexive whereby adaptions and innovation at the operational level may reverberate in 
budgets, services, alliances and even perceptions of global threats to national security. What is 
needed is a way that we can look at this system of military change that is able to take these 
linkages into account. The research project The Drivers of Military Strategic Reform in the 
Face of Economic Crisis and Changing Warfare, led by David Galbreath (also see: Galbreath, 
2016), has suggested a one framework for accomplishing this. As a result, this chapter suggests 
that change can be understand across the literature in three ways, transform, transfer and 
translate.  
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This approach assumes that militaries are always forward leaning even when path dependent 
and perhaps doomed to prepare for the next war in the style of the last one (see Gray, 2005). 
In fact, not only does competition and uncertainty drive change but organisations naturally 
transform, as suggested by Niklas Luhmann (2006). All of this is to say, we should expect to 
see change as a necessary element of transformation.  
 
Secondly, transference entails a relocation from outside a military into said military. Typically, 
the transformation literature has suggested that the US and its so-called Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) have been frames that have impacted on European militaries, whether that is 
network centric warfare, effects-based operations or paramilitary troops (Farrell and Rynning 
2010; Galbreath 2014; 2015) or something more practical like basic military kit. More often 
though, transfer happens through socialization. In their studies of military transformation, Theo 
Farrell et al (2010) and Ina Wiesner (2013) suggest that transformation often happens as a 
result of communication between officers from different militaries, in particular at officer 
training in the US. Reporting those responsible for platforms like networked enabledness, there 
is evidence that some innovations or adaptations are in fact learned, especially when they are 
within the context of a notion or system of war. At the same time, there is often such a 
dependence on deploying with US forces, that there needs to be a way in which European 
armed forces can ‘plug-in’ to US forces without making either less battle-ready (see Rasmussen 
2013). This dilemma fits into the capabilities gap that has arisen between US and European 
forces since the end of the Cold War (see Coonen 2006). However, we should allow for the 
possibility that European to European transfer may be even more relevant than that between 
the US and a European military. Although we can expect that the majority of original 
innovation would be located in a military that is more resourced and diverse like the US 
military, this does not mean to suggest that European forces cannot be the source of innovation 
as well.  
 
Finally, we can think of military change through the concept of translation. Already, we 
understand that while European states may share some basic, and perhaps even advanced, 
notions of war with US forces, we also can see that European states have different military 
traditions and strategic cultures that shape the way they think about deployment and operations. 
In fact, it is difficult to find a direct transfer from one military to another. Nearly 70 years of 
NATO suggests that the translation between the US and European militaries should be 
gradually less over time, but this does not take into account either how resourced and large the 
US military is nor does it take into account the changes in European social values towards 
standing armies since the end of the Cold War. The RMA was translated to Europe, through 
joint deployments, NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and its impact on US and 
European defence industries. Network Centric Warfare, perhaps a major characterization of 
RMA, has been translated however in various different ways in Europe as a result of cultural 
and resources conditions. Cultural and resource conditions are difficult to separate in as far as 
states will seek to resource what they find strategically and culturally important. Of the three 
explanations of change, translation is arguably the most useful in explaining military 
innovation in Europe.  
 
In summary, transform, transfer and translate can be understand to work across the multiple 
levels of change established in the innovation literature review section above. With transfer 
and translate concentrating on the role of social communication and learning, we should not 
forget that there are endogenous reasons why transformation may occur, such as to reduce or 
increase the number frigates, tanks, combat soldiers, establish joint command and operations, 
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etc. Overall, we think that endogenous and exogenous factors are fundamental to understanding 
changes in European militaries. To add another dimension to our analysis, let us now unpack 
changes in European militaries through Galbreath’s three additional categories of followship, 
frontline and falling (Galbreath, 2016). 
 
Case Studies in European Defence Innovation 
 
Galbreath’s three groupings offer an indication of the direction of change within and across 
European militaries. Followship is change that results from a close following of other militaries 
which is an accepted and understood role between follower and the leader, very often the 
United States. Secondly, frontline refers to those militaries that have experienced change as a 
result of combat operations. Finally, there are those militaries and capabilities that are falling 
behind due to falling budgets and falling strategic value. Combining transform, transfer and 
translate with followship, frontline and falling offers a multi-level set of explanations to assess 
European defence innovation comprehensively. 
 
European militaries have been changing in a variety of different ways since the end of the Cold 
War. For the most part, the number and role of the combat soldier has lessened even though 
both Afghanistan and Iraq have had a major land warfare component. The reduction in combat 
and support soldiers across land, sea and air services is also reflected in military capabilities as 
governments were determined to fund fewer platforms, such as tank battalions, frigates, and 
heavy lift aircraft. While the wars of the ‘War on Terror’ have boosted certain elements of 
European militaries, the general direction of military spending on personnel and platforms has 
continued to decline with few exceptions (c.f. Poland). Combining this decline with modern 
warfare as a largely asymmetric, multidimensional affair, militaries have also been seeking to 
work jointly across services. In his major contribution, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed 
Forces, Anthony King argues that there is a ‘fundamental dynamic’ at play with European 
militaries whereby they are undergoing a ‘simultaneous process of concentration and 
transnationalisation’ (King, 2011: 11).  According to King (2011: 17), European armed forces 
are: 
undergoing a compatible but differentiated process of 
‘glocalisation’. They are concentrating at decisive locales from 
which they are extending out increasingly deep institutional 
relations to produce a new military order of multiple, 
interdependent nodes and interconnected transnational 
networks.  
 
Jointness has also become a major part of contemporary military command and operations. In 
the UK, the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) determined that joint budget 
arrangements for operations and kit would need to be inter-service procured and managed. A 
joint- command structure makes this easier to accomplish in theory. The experience in working 
in Afghan Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) has also led European militaries to think 
about doing more in theatre with less. As a result, Sapolsky’s (1972, 2000) notion of a 
bureaucratic politics explanation of innovation becomes challenged as jointness appears to 
obscure the politics behind the change.  
 
Finally, as a result of an evolving and complex threat environment, one whereby the conceptual 
clarity between defence and security has blurred, defence budgets continued to shrink but 
security budgets continue to rise. Militaries have a role to play in traditional and new forms of 
security while at the same time militaries have the incentive to compete for budgets in new and 
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well-funded policy areas. While this has the potential to militarise those new policy areas, this 
situation also provides an opportunity to transform European militaries. The result is a 
combined approach to security challenges. Contemporary military operations are likely to be 
the results of joint commands with increasingly combined roles for civilian departments and 
agencies. This change, along with reduced budgets, pose different challenges for our three 
groups of states within the followship, frontline and falling categories.  
 
Followship  
The most advanced, and predominantly largest militaries fall into this category; in particular, 
the UK, France, Germany and Poland. None of these militaries are seeking to exponentially 
increase their defence capabilities and are only meeting (although not in the case of Germany) 
the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on 
defence (North Atlantic Council, 2014). At the same time, they are in the forefront of military 
transformation in Europe. Yet, how they are changing is different, partly because the US is the 
‘model army’ but also because they have little experience of actually working with each other 
on the ground; even if they did contribute to the same NATO ISAF mission in Afghanistan for 
example. Few common lessons are being learned and internalised due to different national 
priorities and different national constraints. At the same time, there are serious financial 
constraints challenging innovation for these militaries as well.  
 
Though finances are a theme throughout European defence, these states are more serious about 
maintaining modern militaries with the prospect of using them in the future. France and the 
UK have the most advanced and operationally capable militaries in Europe. They have both 
responded to the advances in military concepts and technologies in similar ways. Both states 
have sought to incorporate networked-enabled concepts and technology into their existing 
operational plans and future procurement. The British military has innovated in response to a 
changing external threat environment post-Cold War but this has seen them return to their 
traditional posture as an expeditionary-oriented force. The US has been the leading 
transmission belt for this innovation through its exporting of the RMA and by setting the 
operational agenda over the last 25 years. But this transferring of US innovation has also been 
translated and shaped by two ‘domestic factors’, constraints on military resources and a distinct 
British military culture (Farrell and Bird in Terriff et al, 2010: 56).  
 
The French military has also innovated and transformed in response to ‘strategic and 
technological changes’ with the US as the primary external source of innovation (Farrell et al, 
2013: 277) But they too have sought to translate this innovation to suit their own interests, 
threat perceptions and operational needs. German innovation has not been driven by 
geostrategic factors in the main and the biggest challenge has been the political and domestic 
security culture surrounding the use and the purpose of military force. Although transformation 
has clearly been evident. The German military has innovated its capabilities, doctrine and even 
its operational thresholds. Poland’s transformation since the end of the Cold War has been both 
in the realm of capabilities, concepts and doctrine but it also had to introduce ‘civilian and 
democratic controls’ (Oscia in Terriff et al, 2010: 167). 
 
For all four states, there has been concern about the state and future of their land forces. The 
reduction in the number of those serving has declined and is planned to further decline while 
the remaining soldiers in both armies are to be more operationally effective across a wide 
spectrum of possible deployments.  By and large, this group of countries are the strongest 
European followers of the US broader way of war, though with much less capability and 
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capacity than their US counterparts. These armed forces in these states, to varying degrees, are 
active followers and play a significant and perhaps defining role in European defence.  
 
Frontline  
 
Some militaries find that their ability to innovate is limited to when they are on the frontline. 
In this group are European states such as Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark. 
These states have arguably experienced the most in terms of decline in the number of personnel  
and platforms following the end of Cold War. They were militaries designed largely and 
predominantly for NATO’s territorial defence against a possible Soviet invasion and not for 
the expeditionary conflicts of the sort we have seen in the last 20 years. Their evolution from 
conscription-based militaries to all volunteer forces (AVFs) has also played a major role in this 
reduction in capacity.  Further, these countries took participating in the Afghan and Iraq wars 
to invest in modernizing their forces. As a result, by eliminating (or suspending) national 
service and reducing the number of voluntary enlisted, they drastically reduced their combat 
effectiveness on the ground while continuing to invest in their air power platforms. Thus, the 
key drivers of change in these states have been their simultaneous transformation to AVF with 
limited expeditionary capability via interventionist wars in the Middle-East and North Africa. 
 
Italy, being the largest, has the most to gain from what is happening in the ‘following’ states, 
though Italy (like Spain and further Greece) has had its transformation project curtailed by the 
global financial crisis. Spain, having begun its transformation during the centre-right 
government of José María Aznar, sought to transform its expeditionary and peacekeeping 
troops through ISAF and EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The 
Netherlands has also played an important role in Central Afghanistan and has maintained a 
combat ready ground force that was able to work with the US and UK especially in developing 
COIN capabilities during Task Force Uruzgan. As such, NATO has played a central role in 
shaping Dutch military innovation. The Dutch have also gone further in its naval cooperation 
with Belgium via the so-called Benesam arrangement whereby the two nations have integrated 
command, training and basing for frigates and mine hunters in order to maintain an active naval 
capacity.  
 
Finally, Norway and Denmark have both come out of Afghanistan with a clear direction for 
their militaries and in particular their armies. Norway, has sought to bolster its northern borders 
and economic interests with new battalions, a doctrine it is familiar with from its time as being 
one of two NATO member countries with a border with the Soviet Union. Due to its sizable 
commitment in Afghanistan, Denmark has also developed a more directed doctrine of 
transforming to work directly with the US. They have determined that their strategic interests 
lie with being able to integrate with US forces to the detriment of being able to operate alone 
or with other European states. For all of these states, a frontline was an important modernizer 
for their militaries, especially their armies. However, beyond a front line or a resurgent Russia, 
there is a limited scope or even ability to look for innovation and transformation in the way 
understood in the bigger European military states.  
 
Falling  
 
Although national military organisations do not always want to acknowledge that some ‘core 
tasks’ of their military business can no longer be achieved, for others this Rubicon has already 
been crossed (Galbreath and Smith, 2016: 193-94). In this category are European countries 
	 14	
which are just simply disinvesting in their militaries as a matter of political choice. Namely, 
countries like Belgium, Austria and Sweden have militaries that are increasingly designed for 
deployment in multinational peacekeeping operations rather than for territorial defence; 
although they do remain under the US nuclear umbrella.  
 
For European states like Belgium, the main driver of force transformation and reform is a lack 
of resources. Rather than being uniquely related to defence policy, these militaries essentially 
become an extension of foreign policy. Although they retain very limited military capacity, 
they still attempt to demonstrate their utility to allies and partners by contributing an air 
squadron or some personnel to a NATO, EU or coalition crisis management or peace-keeping 
operation (please see Section Two, chapters 4 and 6 of this book). Naturally, especially in the 
case of Sweden and Austria, there are historical and political reasons why the military may be 
relegated, the further we move away from the Cold War.  
 
 
Conclusion.  
 
This chapter has described historical approaches as well as state-of-the-art theories for 
explaining military innovation generally and with regard to European defence specifically. It 
has sought to give the reader an understanding of the type of questions and challenges that 
scholars of military innovation have grappled with over the last century (see Table 1). The first 
section teased out some of the larger themes that strategists and scholars have derived from 
studying how militaries operate, both as organisations conducting and preparing for combat 
operations. These themes have ranged from attempting to understand the character of the next 
war to a realization that military organisations often learn different (often wrong) lessons from 
the same wars. How the external threat environment is perceived combined with the inevitable 
competition between various distinctive ‘advocates’ of innovation is what drives change in 
defence organisations. 
 
From the work of Barry Posen to Theo Farrell, we have seen how the study of defence 
innovation has assumed a destinct social-science methodology since the early 1980s. Four 
models of innovation were defined (see Table 2). The logics in these approaches portray 
innovation as deriving from civil-military dynamics, to variations of interservice rivalry and 
intraservice competition over scarce resources. Finally, we have seen that military culture is 
also a key driver of, or restraint on, defence innovation. An analytical framework to cut across 
these literatures of transformation was then provided before turning that framework on the 
specificity of European defence innovation. It suggested that change can be understood via the 
concepts of transform, transfer and translate and that European states tend to fall into the 
categories of followship, frontline, and falling. There are clearly challenges facing all European 
armed forces - not least of all declining budgets and personnel. Yet, there is a demonstrable 
shift occurring in both the global and regional political-security atmosphere. It is difficult to 
predict what the future operating environment or the shifting security architecture in Europe 
may bring. But change is the only constant in life and, therefore, some form of innovation is 
inevitable. 
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